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Introduction
Although people diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome 
(AS) report difficulty in understanding what other people 
are thinking (Hochhauser et al., 2015; Locke et al., 2010; 
Muller et al., 2008), research has also shown that in social 
relations this phenomenon is two-sided, because close 
friends and family also have difficulty in understanding 
people with Asperger’s syndrome (PwAS; Brewer et al., 
2016; Froese et al., 2013; Kremer-Sadlik, 2004). 
Misunderstandings (when one party attributes an incor-
rect belief to another party) are therefore experienced by 
both people with AS and their relations, and as such, it is 
important to develop methods for investigating the two-
sided nature of these misunderstandings. While ethnogra-
phy has been productively used to explore the two-sided 
nature of these relationships (Maynard, 2005; Ochs, 2010; 
Solomon, 2010), there is currently a lack of methods used 
in research on AS that systematically compares the per-
spectives of each side within real social relationships.
We report research based on the Interpersonal 
Perception Method (IPM), a two-sided methodology for 
identifying how members of a given social relation 
understand or misunderstand each other. Through a rat-
ing exercise and open-ended discussion, the IPM meth-
odology systematically compares direct perspectives 
(one’s view of Self and one’s view of Other) and meta-
perspectives (how one thinks one is seen by Other), and 
provides a basis for interpreting the origins of misunder-
standing. We used the IPM methodology to examine rela-
tionships involving participants from a charity supporting 
PwAS and their family members (FMs). The IPM was 
used to examine: what misunderstandings occur in 
PwAS–FM relationships? And what reasons do partici-
pants give for such misunderstandings?
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Misunderstandings are social in nature, always having two sides. Yet the misunderstandings experienced by people 
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Misunderstandings in relationships with people 
with Asperger’s
Misunderstandings in PwAS–FM relationships may be 
two-sided (i.e. evident for both people with AS and their 
relatives) for cognitive, social and cultural reasons. 
Cognitive reasons for misunderstanding are well docu-
mented, highlighting how the individuals with AS may 
struggle to make themselves appropriately ‘readable’ to 
others because of limitations in theory of mind (Bowler, 
1992; Spek et al., 2010), executive control (Ozonoff et al., 
1991; Pellicano et al., 2006), emotion perception and regu-
lation (Montgomery et al., 2013; Samson et al., 2012), and 
pragmatic language (Capps et al., 1998; Volden, 1997). 
From the perspective of the ‘neurotypical’ perceiver, the 
individual with AS can be difficult to read, appearing idi-
osyncratic (Brewer et al., 2016; Froese et al., 2013) and 
disconnected from socio-cultural norms (Paul et al., 2009; 
Woodbury-Smith and Volkmar, 2009).
Social reasons emphasise how misunderstandings may 
originate through intersubjective processes (Kremer-
Sadlik, 2004; Linell, 2009; Schegloff, 1992). Divergences 
of information and limited experiential overlap can make 
perspective-taking difficult (Gillespie and Martin, 2014; 
Jones and Nisbett, 1972). In order to avoid misunder-
standings, both parties in a given relationship must work 
together to continually display their own understanding 
and probe the understanding of the other (Ichheiser, 1943; 
Schegloff, 1992). Thus, it is not only people with AS who 
need to explore the perspectives of FMs but also FMs who 
need to explore the perspectives of the person with AS. 
This need is furthered when one considers reports from 
people with autism who are able to articulate their perspec-
tives, revealing how strongly they feel they are misunder-
stood because others do not know what it is like to be 
autistic (McGeer, 2004). The gap in mutual understanding 
is two-sided; however, there is a danger that FMs may not 
see the validity of such claims from PwAS because of their 
diagnosis, which, in turn, might exacerbate such misunder-
standings. FMs, who scaffold perspective-taking in daily 
discourse for PwAS (Kremer-Sadlik, 2004), therefore play 
an important role in creating and addressing misunder-
standings in PwAS–FM relationships.
Cultural reasons for misunderstandings highlight how 
Self–Other awareness is framed by normative expectations 
on what others ought to do given the circumstances 
(McGeer, 2001). What is distinct about PwAS–FM rela-
tionships is that both parties are aware of the diagnosis of 
AS, and the social construction of what that diagnosis 
means (i.e. the ways in which it is represented in culture) 
can ‘loop’ back into the very phenomena it seeks to 
describe (Hacking, 1996, 1999). Representations provide 
pre-packaged images and ideas about groups that are used 
by people to create default expectations about the behav-
iour and thinking of others (Schutz, 1932), and are 
significant for research on AS because of the divergent 
accounts of autism provided by science, the media and 
people with autism themselves (Kenny et al., 2016; 
Pellicano et al., 2014; Sarrett, 2011). For example, people 
with AS feel misrepresented by negative discourses asso-
ciated with autism and disability (Bagatell, 2007), shaping 
how people with AS view themselves and others in rela-
tion to themselves (Parsloe, 2015). Such representations 
also impact those with whom they are intimately con-
nected; for example, the ‘refrigerator parent’ theory of 
autism in the 1950s led to increased stigmatisation and 
guilt experienced by parents (Evans, 2013; Sousa, 2011). 
The looping effect therefore has a significant impact on 
self-identity in such relationships, as knowledge about the 
classification of autism changes the way those who are 
classified behave (Hacking, 1999, 2009; Sarrett, 2011) and 
leads neurotypical individuals to regulate behaviour in 
accordance with perceived norms (McGeer, 2009).
Representations can also affect how others are per-
ceived. Research has shown that perspective-taking is 
‘egocentrically anchored’, in the sense that perspective-
taking begins with the assumption that Other has the 
same perspective as Self. Perspective-taking proceeds 
through serially adjusting from one’s own perspective, 
and such adjustments terminate when a plausible esti-
mate is reached (Epley et al., 2004), reducing the ability 
to correct for additional biases in one’s immediate expe-
rience of others (Nickerson, 1998). Misunderstandings 
may therefore persist and remain unaddressed, because 
individuals seek explanations that conform to their own 
expectations, and will cease to probe beyond such expla-
nations to discover its limitations.
To study empirically how representations of AS are 
differentially used by both people with AS and their FMs, 
we need a method that can study both sides of the social 
relationship.
How can misunderstandings in relationships be 
identified?
The IPM (Laing et al., 1966) was developed to explore 
disagreements, perceived misunderstandings and actual 
misunderstandings in close personal relationships. 
According to this approach, social relationships are con-
ceptualised as comprising direct perspectives (what Self 
and Other think about X) and meta-perspectives (each 
party’s estimation of what the Other thinks about X). 
Comparing these perspectives can reveal three dimen-
sions: disagreements (i.e. comparing what Self and Other 
think about a given topic/person, for example, two people 
holding differing views about their relationship), actual 
misunderstandings (i.e. comparing what Self thinks about 
X with what Other thinks Self thinks about X, for exam-
ple, a difference between one person’s perception of 
another’s view on the relationship, and the Other’s actual 
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view on the relationship) and perceived misunderstand-
ing (i.e. comparing what Self thinks about X with what 
Self thinks Other thinks about X, for example, one person 
anticipating that the Other holds a view about the rela-
tionship which differs from their own view).
This research builds upon the IPM methodology and 
focusses on perceived misunderstanding and actual misun-
derstanding. The ability to perceive the different perspectives 
of others enables actual misunderstandings to be addressed. 
These constructs are relevant to PwAS–FM relations because 
research suggests that PwAS will be limited in their ability to 
perceive differences in perspective from their own view 
(Frith and De Vignemont, 2005), leading to high levels of 
actual misunderstanding (as potential discrepancies in per-
spective between Self and Other remain unaddressed).
The IPM is therefore used to ask: (RQ1) what misun-
derstanding occurs in PwAS–FM relationships? And 
(RQ2), what reasons do participants give for perceived 
misunderstandings? RQ1 is addressed by comparing 
numerical ratings of participants’ rating of Self and their 
predicted rating by Other (perceived misunderstanding), 
and participants’ predicted rating of Self by Other, and the 
rating they actually receive by Other (actual misunder-
standing). RQ2 is addressed by examining the reasons that 
PwAS and their FMs gave for particular ratings.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-two PwAS and their chosen FMs were recruited 
from a charity supporting PwAS (n = 44; 22 dyads). Our 
inclusion criteria for the category of PwAS were broad 
given the challenges associated with diagnosis (Kaland, 
2011; Leekam et al., 2000). Our criteria included (1) diag-
nosis for AS confirmed via contemporaneous reports (e.g. 
clinical records), or participants currently on the diagnos-
tic pathway for AS having been referred for assessment by 
a medical professional, and (2) perceptual reasoning and 
verbal comprehension intelligence quotient (IQ) within the 
normal range (i.e. 70+; see supplementary file, section A). 
Our sample included a gender bias towards males (19:3), 
consistent with current rates of diagnoses for autism spec-
trum conditions (Taylor et al., 2013).
The main inclusion criteria for FMs were that they were 
responsible for the informal care needs of PwAS and did 
not have a formal diagnosis of an autism spectrum condi-
tion themselves. All of our dyads, except one (adult-
cousin), involved adolescent/adult–parent relationships. 
(See Table 1 for details of participants.)
Materials
Contemporaneous reports. Reports including clinical 
reports, school reports and oral reports from staff at the 
charity, members and their parents were used to identify 
potential participants for the study.
The IPM topics and rating mats. A topic list was iteratively 
refined through five pilots using a combination of theory-
driven concepts from the ADI-R (Le Couteur et al., 2006) 
and literature on AS. Topics reflected attested difficulties in 
communication including ‘small talk’ (e.g. difficulties start-
ing interaction), ‘body language’ (e.g. reading non-verbal 
cues) and ‘managing discussion’ (e.g. dialogue and turn-
taking). Narrow interests and systemised routines led to top-
ics on adaptability, including ‘handling criticism’, ‘adapting 
routines’ and ‘sympathising’. Difficulties with future orien-
tation (Howlin et al., 2004; Terrett et al., 2013) led to topics 
of ‘consequences of actions’, ‘organisation’ and ‘five-year 
view’. Finally, research on people with other communica-
tive disabilities highlighted disagreements in perceptions of 
independence (Gillespie et al., 2010), leading to topics of 
‘handle everyday tasks’, ‘make decisions (on own)’ and 
‘visiting new places (on own)’. A context guide provided 
common examples (e.g. ‘everyday activities’ included 
washing up, food shopping and catching the bus) to help 
participants situate the meaning of the IPM items.
To complete the rating, participants used a six-point 
Likert scale from 0 to 5 (see supplementary file, section 
B). Topics were rated using an adapted version of ‘Talking 
Mats’ (Murphy, 2000) where participants were presented 
with items to be placed on the scale (an A3 mat divided 
Table 1. Participant details.
PwAS
Diagnosis AS 18
AS pathway 4
Age (range) 21.09 (16–41)
Gender M:F 19:3
IQ (range) 102.05 (72–128)
Living status Independent 1
Cohabiting 17
Supported housing 2
Unknown 2
Employment 
status
Full-time 1
Part-time 2
Apprenticeship 2
Student (university) 2
College (school/sixth form) 6
Unemployed 9
Relative of PwAS
Relationship 
to PwAS
Parent 21
Cousin 1
Age (range) 53.27 (25–65)
Gender M:F 2:20
AS: Asperger’s syndrome; PwAS: People with Asperger’s syndrome; 
IQ: intelligence quotient.
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into six scoring columns) from ‘is not at all good/often/
easy’ (0) to ‘is very good/often/easy’ (5). This format was 
deemed preferable given its success in assessing people 
with aphasia, learning difficulties, dementia and brain 
injury, and the tendency for participants to adjust ratings as 
they evaluate questions (Moore and Gillespie, 2014).
Procedure
Dyads were briefed together about the nature of the study 
before standard procedures concerning informed consent 
and a demographics questionnaire were completed. 
Participants were studied individually, with the sessions 
audio-recorded. Twelve topics were presented in a ran-
dom order and rated using three different mats: (1) Self 
(e.g. rating themselves), (2) Other (e.g. rating their part-
ner) and (3) Meta (e.g. rating how they perceive their part-
ner will rate them).
The researcher made explicit the rating procedure for 
participants, saying ‘how good do you think you are at 
handling criticism?’ (rating mat 1), ‘How good do you 
think your relative is at handling criticism?’ (rating mat 2) 
and ‘How do you think your relative rated you for han-
dling criticism?’ (rating mat 3). At the end of each rating, 
mat participants were offered the chance to adjust any rat-
ings and to discuss any reflections. Debrief procedures 
completed the session. Ethical approval was granted by the 
researcher’s university and the charity where the research 
was conducted. Results were not returned to participants 
due to the potential for causing interpersonal issues associ-
ated with the discovery of misunderstandings.
Analysis
To identify the misunderstandings that occur in PwAS–FM 
relationships (RQ1), we used numerical ratings to compare 
perceived misunderstandings and actual misunderstand-
ings. Since the data rated were ordinal with non-normal 
distributions, the non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-ranked test was used.
To identify the reasons participants gave for misunder-
standings (RQ2), we used transcribed audio recordings of 
the IPM interview using NVivo 10 (PwAS = 21; FM = 20; 3 
participants declined to be recorded). Analysis focussed 
specifically on the explanations participants provided for 
perceived misunderstanding. A systematic approach of 
iterative categorisation was used (Neale, 2016), involving 
(1) open coding of participant explanations, (2) inductive 
sorting of codes into categories based on links between 
codes and (3) moving iteratively between data and coding 
framework to refine definitions into consistent and dis-
crete categories. The unit of analysis included any mean-
ingful segment of an utterance. FMs provided explanations 
for their ratings more frequently than PwAS (see Table 2), 
and thus, analysis focussed on the instances where partici-
pants did provide explanations and used the IPM scores to 
understand the magnitude of misunderstanding.
Results
RQ1: What misunderstandings occur in PwAS–
FM relationships?
Table 3 presents average ratings from participants across 
all IPM topics. Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranked 
tests with two-tailed significance were used to test for lev-
els of significant perceived misunderstanding and actual 
misunderstandings. Results show that PwAS and FM per-
ceived significant misunderstanding (PwAS: Z = −5.770, 
p < 0.001; FM: Z = −3.448, p = 0. 001). The results also 
indicate that both PwAS and FM did not experience sig-
nificant actual misunderstanding (PwAS: Z = −0.378, 
p = 0.706; FM: Z = −1.018, p = 0.309).
Table 4 reports Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranked 
tests to examine in further detail the perceived misunder-
standing and actual misunderstanding of participants 
according to IPM topics (see supplementary file, section 
C, for median scores). Table 4 shows significant perceived 
misunderstanding, with PwAS expecting lower scores for 
‘handling criticism’ (Mdn. 2 vs 2), ‘adapting routines’ 
(Mdn. 1 vs 2), ‘managing discussions’ (Mdn. 2 vs 3), ‘han-
dling everyday tasks’ (Mdn. 3 vs 3) and ‘making decisions’ 
(Mdn. 2 vs 3). This result shows that PwAS are able to 
predict ratings about themselves that disagree with their 
own self-ratings. Accordingly, PwAS actually misunder-
stand FM on only one topic, ‘adapt routines’ (Mdn. 1 vs 3).
Significant perceived misunderstanding across five top-
ics is also shown by FM, although both high and low rat-
ings were recorded. For ‘sympathy’ (Mdn. 4 vs 4), ‘body 
language’ (Mdn. 4 vs 5) and ‘consequences of actions’ 
(Mdn. 3 vs 4), FM perceived that they would be rated 
lower by PwAS than they had rated themselves. However, 
for ‘small talk’ (Mdn. 4 vs 4) and ‘organisation’ (Mdn. 4 vs 
4), FM perceived that they would be rated higher by PwAS 
than they had rated for themselves.
Table 2. Number of participants who provided an explanation for their rating when meta-representing their partner.
Group (N) No explanation Explanation < 6 topics Explanation ⩾ 6 topics
AS (21) 11 (52%) 7 (33%) 3 (14%)
FM (20)  5 (25%) 9 (45%) 6 (30%)
AS: Asperger’s syndrome; FM: family member.
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Overall, these data show that misunderstandings occur 
on both sides of the relationship, and that perceived misun-
derstanding is more widespread than actual misunder-
standing. PwAS correctly anticipated that their FMs would 
rate them lower in many regards, despite disagreeing with 
such views (i.e. rating themselves higher). This provides 
evidence of sophisticated perspective-taking, which 
researchers and FMs often assume is significantly compro-
mised in individuals with AS (Sofronoff et al., 2014; 
Turowetz, 2015). PwAS represent themselves from the 
viewpoint of FM more negatively, which aligns with 
reports from people with autism about being misunder-
stood by others (Cederlund et al., 2010; McGeer, 2004). 
FM also perceived misunderstanding and rated PwAS 
lower than PwAS rated themselves, which is consistent 
with parent rating behaviour in other studies (Cederlund 
et al., 2010; Koning and Magill-Evans, 2001).
RQ2: What reasons do participants give for 
perceived misunderstanding?
Systematic coding of transcripts revealed perceived mis-
understanding due to reasons associated with Other (two 
subcategories) and Self. Table 5 provides definitions of the 
categories with accompanying examples, and Table 6 
shows the coverage of categories across the participant 
sample.
The diagnosis of AS was rarely mentioned by partici-
pants, perhaps to protect the positive identity of those 
diagnosed, or perhaps because it was so central to the rela-
tionships studied and the purpose for taking part in 
research it was deemed superfluous. However, representa-
tions do not need to be explicitly named in order to be 
used; rather, their use is evident in their effects (Moscovici, 
2007). In this case, the differences in perceiving misun-
derstanding because of Self and Other evident in Table 6 
show the representation of Asperger’s in use.
Table 6 highlights two ways of representing the Other. 
The first, ‘partial impairment in perspective-taking’, is 
two-sided as both PwAS and FM use this representation. 
The tendency to view others as biased in their social infer-
ences is a common feature of interpersonal perception 
(Kruger and Gilovich, 1999; Pronin et al., 2002). In the 
PwAS–FM relationships studied, it was more frequently 
used by FM (95%) than PwAS (48%) which reflects the 
view of people with autism being impaired in the 
Table 3. Do participants experience significant perceived misunderstanding and actual misunderstanding?
Group 
(N)
Average scores for  
rating target
Do participants perceive 
significant misunderstanding?a
Do participants experience 
significant actual misunderstanding?b
Self Other Meta Z Sig. Z Sig.
PwAS (21) 2.75 3.87 2.30 −5.770 < 0.001 −0.378 0.706
FM (20) 4.06 2.29 3.80 −3.448 0.001 −1.018 0.309
PwAS: People with Asperger’s syndrome; FM: family member.
aCalculated by comparing difference between rating of Self and predicted rating of Self by Other.
bCalculated by comparing difference between predicted rating of Self by Other and actual rating by Other.
Table 4. Perceived misunderstanding and actual misunderstandings.
Do PwAS perceive 
misunderstanding with FM 
about rating of PwAS?
Do FM perceive 
misunderstanding with 
PwAS about rating of FM?
Do PwAS 
misunderstand what 
FM thinks of PwAS?
Do FM misunderstand 
what PwAS thinks of 
FM?
 Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Handle criticism −2.266 0.023* −1.687 0.092 −1.058 0.29 −2.854 0.004*
Adapt routines −2.294 0.022* −1.781 0.075 −2.459 0.014* −0.992 0.321
Sympathy −1.252 0.21 −2.215 0.027* −0.884 0.377 −1.308 0.191
Small talk −0.855 0.392 −2.047 0.041* −0.912 0.362 −1.267 0.205
Body language −1.299 0.194 −3.337 0.001* −1.661 0.097 −1.356 0.175
Manage discussion −2.623 0.009* −1.895 0.058 −0.079 0.937 −1.175 0.24
Handle everyday tasks −2.230 0.026* −1.000 0.317 −0.022 0.982 −1.730 0.084
Make decisions (on own) −2.430 0.015* −0.758 0.448 −1.001 0.317 −0.263 0.793
Visit new places −1.107 0.268 −0.265 0.791 −1.132 0.257 −1.713 0.087
Consequences of actions −1.604 0.109 −2.273 0.023* −1.767 0.077 −2.048 0.041*
Organisation −1.363 0.173 −2.179 0.029* −1.059 0.289 −0.254 0.799
Five-year view −0.486 0.627 −0.032 0.974 −1.221 0.222 −0.497 0.619
PwAS: People with Asperger’s syndrome; FM: family member.
Asterisk (*) indicates statistically significant disagreement (p < 0.05).
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intersubjective understanding of others (Smukler, 2005; 
Solomon, 2015). However, it should be noted that PwAS 
perceived that they would not be fully understood by FM, 
which compares with reports from PwAS who feel 
their condition masks their true feelings towards FMs 
(Carrington and Graham, 2001).
Cases where participants perceived the Other to have an 
‘extreme impairment in perspective-taking’ (i.e. claims that 
the Other is unable to introspect or imagine other minds) were 
one-sided as they were only used by FM to describe PwAS. 
This reveals how the representation of Asperger’s, in use by 
FM, licensed a more extreme dismissing of the perspective-
taking abilities of the participants with AS. However, the data 
show that although participants with AS were less likely to 
provide reasons for perceived misunderstandings, most were 
able to reflect on Self and Other in the IPM.
Example 1 illustrates how the tendency for FM to use 
an ‘extreme impairment’ explanation, coupled with more 
nuanced social awareness of PwAS, sets up an actual 
misunderstanding:
Table 5. Categorisation of reasons provided by participants for perceived misunderstanding in the IPM.
Category Subcategory Definition Illustrative Excerpts
The belief that the Other 
causes misunderstandings
Partial impairment in 
perspective-taking
Explanations which focus 
on narrow/restricted 
social understanding and 
perception.
FM7: He’s quite confident talking to new people. 
But then it does go to him talking at people. 
because that’s Asperger’s that’s what they are  
like.
FM13: […] If I’m crying then he knows he has 
upset me but he doesn’t feel the connection.
AS18 […] but she’ll just think ‘well you’re  
doing it in a different way than I would do it,  
so you’re doing it wrong, and I’ve got to sort  
that out’.
AS14: I guess I think she sees me as being more 
attached to comfort zones than I necessarily am.
Extreme impairment 
in perspective-taking
Explanations which focus 
on a complete barrier 
in introspection or 
perspective-taking with 
others.
FM12: He is totally dominated by himself really.
FM8: I don’t think it will enter his head that I 
particularly think about the future.
FM20: […] if he is having one of his meltdowns he 
doesn’t even think about the consequences of his 
actions. It’s just the here and now for that.
FM19: I don’t think he has any idea what body 
language is so it probably doesn’t mean anything.
AS: No Cases
The belief that the Self 
causes misunderstandings
Explanations where 
participants claim it is 
hard to read or imagine 
Others’ thoughts, or that 
the Self obscures being 
easily read by Others.
FM21: […] there are some scenarios where I 
don’t understand why she gets in a flap about 
things.
FM2: Well, I don’t think he thinks I get him. And I 
possibly don’t get him. But I’m trying to.
AS4: It’s hard to think. She doesn’t [.] it’s very 
difficult rating her.
AS9: I’m trying to remember back over times 
when she does. I would say she does but 
sometimes I am just unreadable to her apparently.
IPM: Interpersonal Perception Method.
Table 6. Perceived causes of misunderstanding.
PwAS (n = 21) FM (n = 20)
 No. of 
references
Percentage of 
participants
No. of 
references
Percentage of 
participants
1. Other a cause of misunderstanding 23 48 90 95
1.1 Partial impairment in perspective-taking 23 48 65 95
1.2 Extreme impairment in perspective-taking 0 0 25 75
2. Self a cause of misunderstanding 20 62 14 40
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Example 1: Rating ‘consequences of actions’.
FM9, estimating Other’s rating. (FM9 predicts AS9 will rate 
her = 1; AS9 rates FM9 = 4).
103 BH:  [How often] does he think you think about 
the consequences of your actions?
104 FM9:  To be honest I don’t think he has thought 
about his own consequences.
105   I’ll go for one on that because I don’t think 
he will have ever thought about it to
106  be honest.
107 BH: So he won’t=
108 FM9:  =He won’t think about me he only thinks 
about himself really.
FM9 answers the IPM question (line 103) by repre-
senting AS9 as someone who experiences a complete 
absence of meta-representation (line 104/108). FM9 
expects to receive a low rating from AS9 (= 1), because 
his difficulty in appropriately perceiving Self will result 
in an absent ability to perceive Other (lines 104–106). Yet 
FM9 overestimates the extent of impairment of AS9, 
given the rating actually provided by AS9 (=4) and his 
subsequent explanation:
Example 2: Rating ‘consequences of actions’.
AS9, rating Self.
9 BH:  Ok. How often do you think about the 
consequences of your actions?
10 AS9:  I think in the middle of the road. Sometimes 
I do things without thinking
11   and a lot of times there has been trouble. 
[participant rates 3]
AS9, rating FM9.
96 BH:  How often does she [FM9] think about the 
consequences of her actions?
97 AS9:  I think she knows that she is really good at 
thinking what will happen if
98   something is taken out of context. She makes 
sure people understand her in
99   the way that she wants to be understood. If 
there was something wrong she
100   probably wouldn’t say it out [a]loud to their 
face. [participant rates 4]
Although AS9 confirms FM9’s expectation that ‘conse-
quences of actions’ are a source of difficulty for him (line 
11), it is not to the extent that it prevents him from appre-
ciating the same skill in other people. AS9 articulates a 
clear difference between experiencing the challenges of 
‘consequences of actions’ and observing ‘consequences of 
actions’ in FM9. He is not anchored egocentrically in the 
way FM9 predicts but rather shows a much more nuanced 
and detailed understanding of how ‘consequences of 
actions’ apply differently to Self and Other, coupled with 
an awareness of how FM9’s thoughts and intentions are 
shaped by different situations (line 97–100).
Examples 1 and 2 therefore highlight an actual misun-
derstanding where FM9 overestimates the social impair-
ments of AS9. The origins of overestimation may be both 
interpersonal and cultural. Parents of children with AS 
report levels of elevated stress (Epstein et al., 2008) and 
are more likely to underestimate the social skills of adoles-
cents with autism compared with neurotypical parents 
(Kuo et al., 2011). Frustration with past misunderstandings 
may explain why FM over-estimate the extent of impair-
ment in perspective-taking of PwAS. However, other FM 
who used an extreme view of impairment to describe 
PwAS connected it explicitly to the expectations the diag-
nosis of AS sets up:
Example 3: Rating ‘Managing discussions’.
FM14, rating AS14 (FM14 predicts AS14 will rate her = 3; 
AS14 rates FM14 = 4).
83 FM14:  […] Like the small talk thing he probably 
wouldn’t notice because
84   he’s not that good at it himself so he wouldn’t 
see that in somebody else.
85  Whereas I know I am actually not that good.
86 BH:  So you’re anticipating a sort of misunder-
standing about that in a way?
87 FM14 Yea because of his autism [.] yea.
Example 3 highlights how FM14 perceives misunder-
standing based on normative expectations about an autism 
diagnosis involving an inability to understand others (line 
87). Such expectations may adversely affect interpersonal 
perspective-taking because it prevents FMs from seeking 
out further explanations for why misunderstandings occur, 
leading to the nuanced social ability of PwAS being over-
looked. Although one FM claimed ‘the more I learn about 
Asperger’s the more I can understand AS17’ which she 
reported led to increased patience and the ability to 
‘respond differently’, Example 3 shows that the diagnosis 
can also have negative effects, reinforcing low expecta-
tions about PwAS.
FM under-estimating PwAS was acknowledged by 
FM4 as a problem, ‘He came to me the other day and said 
“You’ve been doing really well mum”, and I thought “Oh 
God”. So sometimes there is a lot more going on than you 
think there is’. In the absence of normative social feed-
back, FM may have to resort to using culturally based 
assumptions about PwAS to interpret their behaviour. This 
perhaps explains why so many FMs used representations 
of perspective-taking impairment to describe PwAS 
(see Table 5). Perceptions of extreme perspective-taking 
impairment may be a simplification of the cognitive view 
on autism (McGeer, 2004; Sarrett, 2011), which theorises 
that perspective-taking difficulties originate from a 
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defective capacity to represent other minds (Boucher, 
2012). Here, we are not dealing with whether some 
approaches to autism and Asperger’s over-emphasise 
immutable cognitive variables (see McGeer, 2004; Sarrett, 
2011), but rather with the way in which these cognitive 
theories become popular representations, used by PwAS 
and their FM. These representations loop back into per-
spective-taking by potentially cutting short peoples’ efforts 
to serially adjust from their own perspective to more ade-
quately approximate the perspectives of PwAS.
Overall, the explanations for misunderstanding pro-
vided by participants showed a strong tendency to focus on 
the limitations of PwAS, with many FMs perceiving an 
extreme impairment in social understanding. While this is 
congruent with the characterisation of people with autism 
as having a lack of self-awareness and a complete inability 
to understand others (Sarrett, 2011), such beliefs prevent 
FM from considering the more nuanced aspects of PwAS 
behaviour. Evidence for this is shown by some of the 
detailed explanations provided by PwAS, which demon-
strate the capability to imagine the subjectivity of others 
across different contexts, despite FM broadly claiming that 
this would not be possible. PwAS also showed a greater 
propensity to reflect on Self as the possible cause of mis-
understanding much more than FM (62% vs 40%). Thus, 
although, PwAS provided less detailed and less frequent 
explanations of misunderstandings, comparing with find-
ings from other interview data (Capps et al., 1998), they 
are not as limited as FM assume in their ratings and 
explanations.
General discussion
We used an adapted version of the IPM (Laing et al., 1966) 
designed for exploring interpersonal relations, to examine 
two-sided misunderstandings in PwAS–FM relations. This 
research makes empirical and methodological contributions.
The quantitative finding showed that PwAS correctly 
anticipated that their FMs would rate them lower in many 
regards, despite the fact that they disagree with their view 
(i.e. rating themselves higher). This was further supported 
by the qualitative finding where, in some cases, PwAS 
were able to imagine that FM would rate PwAS poorly, 
often overgeneralising the extent of their social limita-
tions. The finding extends research showing that PwAS 
are able to recognise and see the problems inherent in their 
own diagnosis of AS (Cederlund et al., 2010) by highlight-
ing the unrealised potential for PwAS to also take the per-
spective of others.
The finding also furthers the discussion about theory of 
mind in people with Asperger’s (Peterson et al., 2009), 
because PwAS were able to accurately predict FM ratings 
but showed a much lower tendency to articulate the rea-
sons for such scores to the researcher (i.e. there is perspec-
tive-taking but less perspective-sharing). Clearly, PwAS 
have theories about the minds of their FMs, but articulat-
ing this to a researcher outside of the family context 
presents more of a challenge. This highlights why there 
may be a validity gap between laboratory and naturalistic 
assessments of the ability to take perspective (Verhoeff, 
2015), namely, because theory of mind experiments focus 
on imputing mental states (i.e. perspective-taking) not on 
communicating and displaying one’s own perspective (i.e. 
perspective-sharing).
The IPM also shows that making oneself readable to 
others may not be straightforward for PwAS. Perceptions 
of extreme perspective-taking impairment used by FM act 
as a confirmatory bias (Nickerson, 1998), preventing FM 
from probing further about the causes of interpersonal mis-
understanding as evidence is interpreted in a way that is 
partial to their existing beliefs. Thus, these representations 
loop back (Hacking, 2009) into the phenomena they pur-
port to describe, potentially leading to the more nuanced 
behaviour of PwAS being overlooked.
The two-sided nature of misunderstandings evident in 
PwAS–FM relationships highlights the importance of how 
we design concepts and apply them to people. Parent inter-
views and questionnaires play an integral role in evaluat-
ing whether or not their children have sufficient problems 
to warrant a diagnosis of AS, and previous studies have 
shown a disparity between the perspectives of PwAS and 
parents (Cederlund et al., 2010). Our data highlight the 
need to place such perspectives on equal footing because 
misunderstandings can be two-sided, and reports from 
people with AS have social validity, despite their diagno-
sis. In addition, diagnoses extend beyond improving access 
to support and services (Kite et al., 2013), to impact iden-
tity in both positive (Chell, 2006; Parsloe, 2015) and nega-
tive ways (Broderick and Ne’eman, 2008; Sarrett, 2011; 
Smukler, 2005) within social relationships (Powell and 
Acker, 2016). Our study provides evidence about how 
the representation of AS loops back to operate at the inter-
personal level, shaping how relations are perceived and 
managed by framing normative expectations about per-
spective-taking, specifically for FM. Knowledge about 
diagnoses can act as a turning point in the parents’ journey 
of understanding their children (Robinson et al., 2015). It 
therefore follows that the findings of this article, specifi-
cally that FMs over-estimate the impairment of PwAS and 
that this is supported by their representations of AS, can 
itself be relayed back to parents at the point of diagnosis to 
mitigate the impact of confirmatory biases.
In addition to empirical contributions, the two-sided 
IPM methodology contributes to the methodological 
toolkit for understanding PwAS for three reasons. First, it 
situates social understanding within significant and famil-
iar social relations, enabling researchers to overcome the 
validity gap between abstract assessments and real-world 
phenomena (Verhoeff, 2015) and to study the production 
and circulation of knowledge about autism in family 
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settings (Solomon, 2010). Second, it places PwAS and FM 
on an equal footing, avoiding the risk of reinforcing expec-
tation about misunderstandings originating from PwAS 
(Turowetz, 2015). Finally, this two-sided methodology is a 
form of targeted ethnography that allows the origins of 
misunderstandings to be identified and to be potentially 
used to develop interventions.
Limitations
Most relationships involved mother–son relationships, and 
thus the findings may not account for gender differences 
when parenting children with autism (Jones et al., 2013), 
such as daughters who are sometimes perceived to have 
greater impairments as a result of higher parental expecta-
tions (Holtmann et al., 2007; McLennan et al., 1993). 
Likewise, girls with AS have a different behavioural phe-
notype to boys (Rivet and Matson, 2011) with greater lan-
guage and social skills (Kopp and Gillberg, 1992) which 
can mask their condition and impact the ratings provided 
in the IPM. Participants were also recruited via a charity, 
and thus, the sample reflects the population of PwAS who 
were willing to take part in research and also had FMs who 
were accessible. Not captured within the data are PwAS–
FM relationships where misunderstandings have become 
so severe that the relationships have broken down. Also, 
FM could possess traits of AS (Nydén et al., 2011) which 
would potentially impact their ability to perceive misun-
derstanding. Resource constraints prevented assessments 
of FM, although any potential traits were not significant 
enough to prevent parents from living independent lives 
and finding employment.
The study assessed topics related to social skill; how-
ever, interpersonal relations involve perspective-taking 
about other phenomena, such as likes/dislikes and political 
views. PwAS also exhibit better social skills when social 
cues are made explicit (Senju et al., 2009), and thus, the 
semi-structured interview style of the IPM may not capture 
the full complexity of everyday misunderstandings that 
PwAS experience. Since misunderstandings are interac-
tionally achieved, rather than purely cognitive mistakes, 
analysing real-life interactions between PwAS and FM 
would yield important further insights about how misun-
derstandings are negotiated and integrated into shared 
understanding.
The two-sided methodology used here has potential to 
be used, and adapted, alongside existing measures of AS in 
order to develop a more holistic understanding of (1) the 
origins of misunderstanding in relationships involving 
PwAS and (2) how an AS diagnosis impacts misunder-
standings within these social relations.
Conclusion
The empirical contribution of the study has shown that 
people with Asperger’s are able to predict lower scores 
from FMs, despite disagreeing with their view, and that 
FMs often over-estimate the extent to which relatives with 
AS are egocentrically anchored in their own perspective. 
The methodological contribution of the study demon-
strates that a two-sided methodology is viable and can be 
used to identify social processes that both support and hin-
der social understanding within relationships affected by a 
diagnosis of AS.
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